Dynamic Principal-Multiple Agent Contracts
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- Stephen E. Spear & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617.
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Keywordsdynamic contracts; mechanism design; tournaments; lotteries;
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
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