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Abstract Of Contracting For Non-Point-Source Pollution Abatement


  • Olof BYSTROM


  • Daniel W. BROMLEY



This paper presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural non-point-source pollution. The analysis is based on a nested agent framework with three parties; farmers, a country's government, and the governments of all countries that affect each other's environmental quality. Unlike previous analysis of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest non-individual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority as a solution to the domestic pollution problem. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. To solve the international problem of pollution management of a common (water) resource, we propose an international agency with authority to write and enforce contracts in each of its member countries. We show that the information requirement on a country's government can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made non-individual.

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  • Olof BYSTROM & Daniel W. BROMLEY, 1996. "Abstract Of Contracting For Non-Point-Source Pollution Abatement," Staff Papers 392, University of Wisconsin Madison, AAE.
  • Handle: RePEc:wop:wiaesp:392

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Carter, Michael R., 1988. "Equilibrium credit rationing of small farm agriculture," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 83-103, February.
    2. Basu, Kaushik, 1986. "The market for land : An analysis of interim transactions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 163-177.
    3. Pinckney, Thomas C & Kimuyu, Peter K, 1994. "Land Tenure Reform in East Africa: Good, Bad or Unimportant?," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 3(1), pages 1-28, April.
    4. Migot-Adholla, Shem, et al, 1991. "Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 5(1), pages 155-175, January.
    5. Ault, David E & Rutman, Gilbert L, 1979. "The Development of Individual Rights to Property in Tribal Africa," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 163-182, April.
    6. Pranab Bardhan., 1987. "Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development," Economics Working Papers 8761, University of California at Berkeley.
    7. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211-211.
    8. Johnson, Omotunde E G, 1972. "Economic Analysis, The Legal Framework and Land Tenure Systems," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 259-276, April.
    9. Feder, Gershon & Noronha, Raymond, 1987. "Land Rights Systems and Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan Afric a," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 2(2), pages 143-169, July.
    10. Bromley, Daniel W., 1989. "Property relations and economic development: The other land reform," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 867-877, June.
    11. Daniel Bromley, 1992. "The commons, common property, and environmental policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(1), pages 1-17, January.
    12. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-937, October.
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