Inequality and Redistribution in Multiple Dimensions
A three-class game of redistribution without a pure strategy equilibrium is studied under a model of adaptive politicians. This model allows us to integrate one person - one vote models of redistribution with the models which emphasize political influence so as to study when different social classes will form coalitions against each other and what types of redistributive policies are likely to emerge from that interaction. For a wide range of parameter specifications, we find that inequality is negatively related to redistribution.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1998|
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