IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Governance of Trial Judges: The Internal Politics of a Judges' Sponsoring Organization

  • Herbert Jacob
Registered author(s):

    The organization of trial courts is usually considered in terms of its impact on the efficiency of case disposition. This paper focuses on how the organization of a court is a by-product of the relationships that develop among judges and how the resulting organization affects the allocation of resources to different sets of litigants and clients of a court. As a consequence of the manner in which the court is organized, some litigants receive very little court time and less qualified judges while others receive much court time and the services of the court's most experienced judges. Clientele groups such as specialized bars, central city commercial interests, and suburban interests receive services in proportion to their ability to penetrate the judge's sponsoring organization. These conclusions are founded on research about one very large urban trial court (the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois) which has 400 judges and exercises exclusive jurisdiction over all cases in the county arising under state law. The analysis is based on extended interviews with all judges possessing supervisory authority and additional ordinary judges (total n=54), official documents, and media reports. The research puts flesh on the concept of a judge's sponsoring organization and invites comparison with the sponsoring organizations of prosecutors, plaintiff's attorneys, and defense attorneys.

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Paper provided by Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University in its series IPR working papers with number 95-27.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation:
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:wop:nwuipr:95-27
    Contact details of provider: Postal: 2040 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-4100
    Phone: 847-491-8712
    Web page: http://www.nwu.edu/IPR/publications/wpindex1.html
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:nwuipr:95-27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.