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Runs on Tokenized Debt

Author

Listed:
  • Luis Araujo

    (Michigan State University and Sao Paulo School of Economics)

  • Ryuichiro Izumi

    (Department of Economics, Wesleyan University)

  • Fabrizio Mattesini

    (Universita di Roma, Tor Vergata, Italy)

Abstract

We study how debt tradability in secondary markets affects efficiency and fragility. Motivated by fiat-backed stablecoins, we extend the Diamond-Dybvig framework by allowing a fraction of the issuer’s liabilities to be transferred to outside investors before the investment matures, while holders retain the option of redeeming with the issuer. Tradability improves efficiency by allowing the issuer to invest in less liquid, more productive investments. However, tradability has a non-monotone effect on fragility. When secondary markets are thin, tradability introduces self-fulfilling debt runs as an additional source of coordination failure, increasing fragility. Yet when secondary markets are sufficiently liquid, this additional source of coordination failure instead eliminates fragility altogether, as the issuer can meet all early redemptions from liquidation alone regardless of investor behavior. Thus, tokenizing demandable debts can decrease fragility although it in principle adds another source of coordination failure. Our results suggest that the designs of stablecoins, tokenized deposits, and tokenized MMFs should focus on ensuring sufficient depth in secondary markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Araujo & Ryuichiro Izumi & Fabrizio Mattesini, 2026. "Runs on Tokenized Debt," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2026-006, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wes:weswpa:2026-006
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    File URL: http://repec.wesleyan.edu/pdf/rizumi/2026006_izumi.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Araujo, Luis & Izumi, Ryuichiro & Mattesini, Fabrizio, 2026. "Bank runs and interventions with wholesale funding," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
    4. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System

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