A Note on Unobservable Mixed Strategies in Negotiation Games
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References listed on IDEAS
- Amartya K. Sen, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 307-317.
- Bossert, Walter, 1993. "Continuous Choice Functions and the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 379-385, April.
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