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Procedural Intergenerational Equity and the Social Discount Factor: A Bargaining Approach

Author

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  • Ken-Ichi Akao

    (School of Social Sciences, Waseda University 1-6-1 Nishiwaseda Shinjuku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan)

Abstract

This paper develops a procedural foundation for the social discount factor. Building on Binmore (2005), we define a procedurally intergenerationally equitable (PIE) path as the outcome of intergenerational bargaining. We then identify the discount factor under which a Ramsey model replicates this path and interpret it as an intergenerationally justifiable (IJ) discount factor. Using tractable models, we show that the IJ discount factor is closely linked to the economic environment. In a benchmark case, the corresponding discount rate coincides with the output elasticity of capital. We further examine a non- overlapping generations model with intergenerational altruism and an overlapping- generations model with individual time preferences, and show how these factors affect the IJ discount factor. These results establish a procedural foundation for the social discount factor and reinterpret discounted utilitarianism within a social contract framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Ken-Ichi Akao, 2026. "Procedural Intergenerational Equity and the Social Discount Factor: A Bargaining Approach," RIEEM Discussion Paper Series 2602, Research Institute for Environmental Economics and Management, Waseda University.
  • Handle: RePEc:was:dpaper:2602
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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