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Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: The Dilemma of Consistency and Revision in Expert Communication

Author

Listed:
  • Yoshio Kamijo

    (Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University)

  • Daiki Kishishita

    (Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University)

  • Satoru Shimokawa

    (Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University)

Abstract

This paper identifies a fundamental expert communication dilemma: citizens distrust consistent advice as a signal of bias, yet distrust revision as indicating limited knowledge. We formalize this in a repeated cheap-talk model with bias uncertainty and gradually accumulating evidence. Theoretically, perfect compliance obtains without private information but collapses otherwise. Experiments reveal the dilemma is more severe than predicted, emerging even without private information. Importantly, private signals do not reduce welfare but instead filter incorrect advice. Finally, compliance substantially recovers with algorithmic advisors, suggesting automated advice mitigates communication failures in controversial policy environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoshio Kamijo & Daiki Kishishita & Satoru Shimokawa, 2026. "Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: The Dilemma of Consistency and Revision in Expert Communication," Working Papers 2532, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wap:wpaper:2532
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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