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Scoring rule auctions and favoritism: an empirical study on Italian public procurement for canteens

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  • Riccardo Camboni Marchi Adani

    (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

Abstract

We built an original dataset of 307 auctions aimed at awarding canteen services in Italy; it contains scoring rules, first price, and average bid mechanisms. We exploit this dataset to test the degree of competitiveness and the presence of favoritism by public contracting authorities (CAs) towards a possibly predetermined bidder. We start with a working hypothesis: a presumption of which auctions were competitive; we then run an econometric test and construct a variable that individuates possible non-competitive behaviors. Our results highlight that scoring rules can be distorted to favor a bidder, and the victory of the incumbent is associated with lower competition, which is a sign of favoritism.

Suggested Citation

  • Riccardo Camboni Marchi Adani, 2016. "Scoring rule auctions and favoritism: an empirical study on Italian public procurement for canteens," Working Papers 08/2016, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ver:wpaper:08/2016
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