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Deep Pockets, Extreme Preferences: Explaining Persistent Differences in Electoral Contributions Across Industries

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Bassetti

    (University of Padova)

  • Filippo Pavesi

    (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

Abstract

When considering contributions to electoral campaigns in the U.S., a puzzling regularity is that some industries tend to spend significantly more than others. To explain this evidence, we present a simple theoretical model in which interest groups finance politicians that require funding for campaign advertising in exchange for policy favors. Our model predicts that interest groups with more extreme preferences will devote a greater amount of resources to campaign financing. The empirical evidence, based on data from the U.S. House elections between 2000 and 2004, strongly supports this finding.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Bassetti & Filippo Pavesi, 2014. "Deep Pockets, Extreme Preferences: Explaining Persistent Differences in Electoral Contributions Across Industries," Working Papers 04/2014, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ver:wpaper:04/2014
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Campaign Finance; Interest Groups; Elections; Extreme Preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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