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Symmetric revealed cores and pseudocores, and Lawvere-Tierney closure operators


  • Stefano Vannucci



A choice function is a symmetric revealed core if there exists a symmetric irreflexive ‘dominance’ digraph such that choice sets consist precisely of the locally undominated outcomes of the latter. Symmetric revealed pseudocores are similarly defined by omitting the irreflexivity requirement on the underlying digraph. Lawvere-Tierney (LT) closure operators are those closure operators which are meet-homomorphic: they may be regarded as an algebraic representation of a geometric modality denoting ‘locally true’, and provide the mathematical backbone of a generalized version of so-called ‘Grothendieck topologies’ in categories. The classes of symmetric revealed cores and pseudocores are characterized, and their basic order-theoretic structure is studied. In particular, it is shown that their respective posets are sub-meet-semilattices of the canonical lattice of choice functions. An order duality theorem concerning the posets of symmetric revealed pseudocores and LT closure operators on a given ground set is also established.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Vannucci, 2010. "Symmetric revealed cores and pseudocores, and Lawvere-Tierney closure operators," Department of Economics University of Siena 602, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:602

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Earle, John S. & Pagano, Ugo & Lesi, Maria, 2006. "Information technology, organizational form, and transition to the market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 471-489, August.
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    More about this item


    Choice function; game solution; core; pseudocore; symmetric digraph; Lawvere-Tierney closure;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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