Analyzing Corruption Possibilities in the Gaze of the Media
In this paper analyze the economic incentives that govern the strategic relationship between the government and the independent media has been analysed using a consistent analytical framework.The analysis focuses on the extent to which theâ€˜freeâ€™ press can act as a deterrent to corruption in governance. It has been found out that although â€˜press freedomâ€™ is indeed important as stressed in the existing literature, both mutually profitable cover-up arrangements as well as the governmentâ€™s ability to â€˜manageâ€™ the mediaâ€™s allegations tend to have a substantial negative impact on the mediaâ€™s role as an effective watchdog. Also, more competition in the media sector need not necessarily translate into increased deterrence from corruption.[DiscussionPaperNo.2001/30]
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- Skaperdas, S., 1991.
"Cooperation, Conflict And Power In The Absence Of Property Rights,"
90-91-06a, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September.
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