New Approaches in Coalition Stability
In this paper we propose the state of art in the theory of coalitional games in effectiveness form without bargaining between coalitions. We study some solution concepts: The largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994); the largest cautious consistent set (Mauleon et al., 2004); the credible consistent set (Bhattacharya, 2002); standard stable behaviors (Xue, 1998). A series of examples, showing main features and differences between these solutions, are presented in order to outline some drawbacks and positive aspects in the philosophical framework of stability concepts.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2009|
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