An Incomplete Contract Theory of Contract Duration and Specific Investment
This paper develops a theoretical model of contract duration. The model fills a gap in incomplete contract theories, which for the most part assume timeless contracting, or contracts which last for the full life of a specific investment. The model reveals an asymmetry between buyer and seller investment, and the precise sense in which duration can be expected to depend on specific investments. It also addresses the importance of the background legal system.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 44 1603 591131
Fax: +44(0)1603 4562592
Web page: http://www.uea.ac.uk/eco/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Helen Chapman, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uea:papers:9707. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alasdair Brown)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.