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Income distribution and the incentive to privatization

Author

Listed:
  • Caterina Colombo
  • Corrado Benassi
  • Alessandra Chirco

Abstract

Within the standard framework of mixed oligopoly theory, in this paper we investigate how changes in the distribution of income affect demand and the incentives towards privatization. We show that the scope for privatization is widened when the market is poorer, and when incomes become moreconcentrated. These results are accounted for in terms of the way distributional shocks alter the allocative inefficiency of imperfectly competitive markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Caterina Colombo & Corrado Benassi & Alessandra Chirco, 2023. "Income distribution and the incentive to privatization," Working Papers 20230812, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:udf:wpaper:20230812
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mixed oligopoly; income distribution; privatization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets

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