IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

To leave or to stay? Uruguay and Paraguay within the Mercosur


  • Elvio Accinelli

    () (UASLP, Facultad de Economía, San Luis Potosí, México)

  • Pedro Suárez

    () (UASLP, Facultad de Economía, San Luis Potosí, México)


The main objective of this paper is to show that when countries conforming a block that makes what some specialists have called: regionalism or integration -- having between them big asymmetries -- the policy to threat to leave the block can be a very efficient policy for those countries more harmed by the presence of such asymmetries. In particular in this article we analyze the current situation inside of the Southern Common Market or at it is better known in Latin America as MERCOSUR.

Suggested Citation

  • Elvio Accinelli & Pedro Suárez, 2008. "To leave or to stay? Uruguay and Paraguay within the Mercosur," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0608, Department of Economics - dECON.
  • Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:0608

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Montinola, Gabriella R. & Jackman, Robert W., 2002. "Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(01), pages 147-170, January.
    2. Inna Cabelkova, 2001. "Perceptions of Corruption in Ukraine: Are They Correct?," Public Economics 0110004, EconWPA.
    3. Inna Cabelkova, 2001. "Perceptions of Corruption in Ukraine: Are They Correct?," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp176, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Asymmetries; Integration; Nash Equilibria;

    JEL classification:

    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:0608. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Andrea Doneschi) or (Héctor Pastori). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.