IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ubs/wpaper/ubs0411.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Chief Executives' Term Limits and Fiscal Policy Choices: International Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Chiara Dalla Nogare
  • Roberto Ricciuti

Abstract

According to reputational models of Political Economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 59 countries over the period 1975-1997, using government spending, revenue, surplus and social and welfare spending as policy choice variables. We use both cluster analysis and panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term limited chief executives with respect to those who are not. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results on US states and international data.

Suggested Citation

  • Chiara Dalla Nogare & Roberto Ricciuti, "undated". "Chief Executives' Term Limits and Fiscal Policy Choices: International Evidence," Working Papers ubs0411, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ubs:wpaper:ubs0411
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://fausto.eco.unibs.it/~segdse/paper_pdf/pdf0411.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4099 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Roberto Casarin & Carmine Trecroci, 2006. "Business Cycle and Stock Market Volatility: A Particle Filter Approach," Working Papers ubs0603, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ubs:wpaper:ubs0411. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Matteo Galizzi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/febreit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.