Screening When Some Agents are Non-Strategic: Does a Monopoly Need to Exclude? (Technical Supplement)
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Keywordsmechanism design; screening; honesty; bounded rationality.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-MIC-2006-01-01 (Microeconomics)
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