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Screening When Some Agents are Non-Strategic: Does a Monopoly Need to Exclude? (Technical Supplement)


  • Deneckere, Raymond
  • Severinov, Sergei


Technical supplement to the paper forthcoming in Rand Journal of Economics.

Suggested Citation

  • Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2005. "Screening When Some Agents are Non-Strategic: Does a Monopoly Need to Exclude? (Technical Supplement)," working papers severinov-05-12-26-01-26-, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 26 Dec 2005.
  • Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:severinov-05-12-26-01-26-15

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    mechanism design; screening; honesty; bounded rationality.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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