Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents
This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter examples to both these theorems when there are multiple agents.
|Date of creation:||17 Dec 2003|
|Date of revision:||12 Feb 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-03-12-17-12-42-59. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Maureen Chin)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.