A Diamond-Dybvig Model Without Bank Run: the Power of Signaling
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- Hubert Janos Kiss, 2011. "A Diamond-Dybvig model without bank run: the power of signaling," Cuadernos de Economía - Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, ELSEVIER, vol. 34(94), pages 20-26, Enero-Abr.
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Keywordsbank run; sequential game; signaling; iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies; coordination.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2010-12-04 (Banking)
- NEP-FMK-2010-12-04 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-GTH-2010-12-04 (Game Theory)
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