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The term structure of market efficienty

Author

Listed:
  • Breugem Matthijs

    (Collegio Carlo Alberto and University of Turin)

  • Buss Adrian

    (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management and CEPR)

  • Marfè Roberto

    (Collegio Carlo Alberto and ESOMAS Department, University of Turin)

Abstract

We study the impact of investor investment horizon on information choice and the ability of stock prices to aggregate information of di erent payo horizons the Term Structure of Market E ciency (TSME). We do so in a dynamic rational expectation economy with both short-term and long-term investors who can acquire information about short-term or long-term payoffs. First, we nd that long-term investors buy both more long-term as short-term information than short-term investors do. Second, the presence of long-term investors increases the willingness of short-term investors to acquire long-term information. This arises since short-term investors care about long-term information to the extent that future prices at which they liquidate their investments reflect long-term payoffs and a larger share of long-term investors increases future price informativeness. Third, the slope of the TMSE is generally decreasing since due to market memory, short-term information was already incorporated in past asset prices. Only for extremely low costs for long-term information acquisition, the slope of the TMSE can be increasing.

Suggested Citation

  • Breugem Matthijs & Buss Adrian & Marfè Roberto, 2025. "The term structure of market efficienty," Working papers 103, Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino.
  • Handle: RePEc:tur:wpapnw:103
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cespa, Giovanni, 2002. "Short-term investment and equilibrium multiplicity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1645-1670, October.
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    3. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
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    7. Vives, Xavier, 1995. "Short-Term Investment and the Informational Efficiency of the Market," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(1), pages 125-160.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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