Optimal Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Linear Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game
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Keywordsdiscrete public good; subscription game; Revelation Principle;
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-02-14 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-PBE-2009-02-14 (Public Economics)
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