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Data Sharing, Privacy, and Innovation in Healthcare

Author

Listed:
  • Canta, Chiara
  • D’Annunzio, Anna
  • Lefouili, Yassine

Abstract

We study the impact of privacy regulation on data-driven innovation and welfare in the healthcare sector. A platform providing medical services (e.g., a hospital) collects patient data and may sell non-rival access to downstream innovators. Without data externalities, consent can induce inefficiently low data sharing because the platform cannot identify privacy-concerned patients and captures only part of the social value of innovation. Consequently, requiring consent can reduce welfare for intermediate privacy costs. When one patient’s disclosure reveals information about others, consent decisions become strategic complements. These externalities reduce the compensation required for disclosure and can instead produce excessive sharing, potentially justifying additional restrictions on compensation or data sharing. If the platform controls innovator access, consent can induce excessive restrictions without data externalities, whereas sufficiently strong externalities can lead the platform to admit too many innovators.

Suggested Citation

  • Canta, Chiara & D’Annunzio, Anna & Lefouili, Yassine, 2026. "Data Sharing, Privacy, and Innovation in Healthcare," TSE Working Papers 26-1783, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:132282
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    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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