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Tarification d’accès et qualité du réseau dans le transport ferroviaire

Author

Listed:
  • Bontems, Philippe
  • Calmette, Marie-Françoise
  • Martimort, David

Abstract

This paper studies access pricing in a vertically separated railway sector where the in-frastructure manager sets access charges and chooses network quality, while downstream operators choose transport services. The model characterizes the inefficiencies of unregula-ted vertical separation and then derives optimal regulation with and without public transfers. When transfers are constrained, access charges follow a Ramsey logic modified by downs-tream market power and by cross-effects among long-distance operators. Under asymmetric information, the relevant access cost is no longer the physical marginal cost but a virtual cost that incorporates the information rents of the infrastructure manager and the traffic consequences of incentive constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Bontems, Philippe & Calmette, Marie-Françoise & Martimort, David, 2026. "Tarification d’accès et qualité du réseau dans le transport ferroviaire," TSE Working Papers 26-1753, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:131798
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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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