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Montes Argentum Mihi Dant (Il Trentino Alto Adige di fronte alla globalizzazione)

Author

Listed:
  • Paola Antonicelli

    ()

  • Maria Della Lucia

    () (DISA, Faculty of Economics, Trento University)

  • Enrico Zaninotto

    () (DISA, Faculty of Economics, Trento University)

Abstract

L'articolo pone a confronto il modello di sviluppo del Trentino Alto Adige con quello generale del Nord-Est cercando di isolarne le determinanti specifiche in modo da valutare la sostenibilità nel tempo del modello di sviluppo seguito dalla regione alpina. A tal fine vengono analizzate in particolare le specializzazioni produttive, la dinamica imprenditoriale e le attività di innovazione.

Suggested Citation

  • Paola Antonicelli & Maria Della Lucia & Enrico Zaninotto, 2001. "Montes Argentum Mihi Dant (Il Trentino Alto Adige di fronte alla globalizzazione)," ROCK Working Papers 013, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 12 Jun 2008.
  • Handle: RePEc:trt:rockwp:013
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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