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Spilli, orologi e macchine da calcolo - Divisione e ricomposizione del lavoro per gli economisti classici (e i moderni) . (In Italian)


  • Enrico Zaninotto

    () (DISA, Faculty of Economics, Trento University)


Nel pensiero di alcuni economisti classici (Smith, Babbage, Marx e Marshall) si rinviene l'origine di due tradizioni interpretative dell'impresa capitalistica, intesa come istituzione in grado di gestire la divisione del lavoro. La prima è connessa all'idea di indivisibilità dei fattori e di rendimenti crescenti: questa visione dà origine all'idea di impresa come meccanismo di soluzione di conflitti. La seconda matrice presenta l'impresa come meccanismo per la produzione di razionalità decisionale; in questa visione si evidenzia il ruolo che assumono nell'impresa i meccanismi di scoperta e di coordinamento. Le due visioni, tuttavia, sono state accolte in ambiti teorici diversi e in larga parte reciprocamente isolati: pur con alcune eccezioni, la moderna teoria dell'impresa evidenzia gli aspetti dell'impresa connessi al conflict solving; la sociologia delle organizzazioni e il management science sottolineano invece il ruolo delle organizzazioni come meccanismo di problem solving in presenza di complessità e di limiti alla razionalità.

Suggested Citation

  • Enrico Zaninotto, 2000. "Spilli, orologi e macchine da calcolo - Divisione e ricomposizione del lavoro per gli economisti classici (e i moderni) . (In Italian)," ROCK Working Papers 008, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 21 Mar 2000.
  • Handle: RePEc:trt:rockwp:008

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    References listed on IDEAS

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