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"Communication and Coordination in Organizations" (in Japanese)

  • Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

  • Hirokazu Takizawa

    (Faculty of Economics, Chuo University)

  • Noriyuki Yanagawa

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

  • Yasunori Watanabe

    (School of Grobal Studies, Tama University)

This paper analyzes a model of coordination where two agents attempt to coordinate their actions through communication. One agent (Sender) is engaged in finding the true state of nature in a stochastic environment and the action that best fits the state. The other agent (Receiver) in turn tries to ``understand'' the Sender's message and chooses his own action. Since the communication succeeds only probilistically, so does the coordination. In our model, two different modes of coordination are identified: the integral-type coordination based on the communication of soft information and the default-type coordination based on the predetermined default value. We find that the agents might choose the latter mode of coordination when the cost arising from the failed communication is high relative to the benefit from coordinating on the state-contingent best actions. Applications to the economics of organization are also discussed.

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Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE J-Series with number CIRJE-J-213.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tky:jseres:2009cj213
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