"Voice Matters in a Dictator Game"(in Japanese)
We examine a dictator game with a "voice" option in the laboratory. In the dictator game, player 1 dictates how to divide a pie, and player 2 simply receives his/her share, i.e., unlike in an ultimatum game, he/she does not have an option to reject this division. In our experiment, player 2 has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for the minimum acceptable offer before player 1 dictates his/her offer. In this game,it is predicted not only by the standard game theory, but by the behavioral game theory such as the theory of other-regarding preferences, that player 1's offer is independent of player 2's request. Some findings based on our data are as follows: the above independence hypothesis is rejected; as player 2's request increases, player 1's offer increases when the requests are less than 50% of the pie; on the other hand, when the request goes beyond 50% of the pie, the offer decreases as the request increases. That is, "voice" matters without having strategic meaning. We also conduct a clustering analysis to find three notably different tendencies among player 1's behavior.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033|
Web page: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/index.html
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tky:jseres:2004cj104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CIRJE administrative office)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.