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"Communication Competition Models and Gatekeepers: Agent-Based Simulation and the Case of Merck" (in Japanese)


  • Nobuo Takahashi

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

  • Kenichi Kuwashima

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

  • Masaki Tamada

    (Kozo Keikaku Engineering, Inc.)


The purpose of this paper is to analyze the emerging process of organizations by using agent-based simulation. The agent-based simulation is one of the representative methods of complexity research and recently used to learn from local problems and to devise a global solution. We develop an agent-based communication competition model which is familiarly called "ComCom Model." The implications of the simulations are as follows: (1) The big agents cannot win small agents over their side. (2) The big agents increase the emerging speed of the large clusters in the start up phase. However, they cannot improve cluster's communication performance in the steady phase. (3) The big agents are not at the centers of the clusters. They move around at outskirts of the clusters. It looks like tentacles. (4) The wandering model of agents having high propensity to change has never reached any equilibrium points. But the wandering model improves clusters' communication performance in comparison with the bounded rational and equilibrium model. The big agents are considered as "gatekeepers" mentioned in the R&D literature. We investigate Merck & Co. and find out the facts that its gatekeepers have increased the emerging speed of the global R&D team and that this is the core competence of Merck.

Suggested Citation

  • Nobuo Takahashi & Kenichi Kuwashima & Masaki Tamada, 2000. ""Communication Competition Models and Gatekeepers: Agent-Based Simulation and the Case of Merck" (in Japanese)," CIRJE J-Series CIRJE-J-33, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  • Handle: RePEc:tky:jseres:2000cj33

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