Dynamic Provision of Public Goods as Environmental Externalities
This paper investigates dynamic properties of environmental externalities with a framework of voluntary provision of a public good by analyzing the intimate duration dynamic game. We compare the first best solution, the open-loop solution under enforceable commitments, and the closed-loop solution without commitment. We explore the free riding problem and consider the normative role of Pigovian consumption taxes to internalize the free riding problem. We also investigate the adjustment speeds of environmental quality under alternative solutions and examine the impact of Pigovian consumption taxes on the adjustment speed.
|Date of creation:||Feb 1997|
|Date of revision:|
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