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Trust and Policy Capacity - Strategic Bureaucrat Appointments under Electoral Incentives

Author

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  • Dana Sisak

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

  • Otto Swank

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Abstract

We investigate the determinants of states' policy capacity, defined as the ability of states to craft effective policies. Our model shows that the interaction between politicians' implementation decisions and bureaucrats' motivation to design effective policies can lead to the coexistence of high-trust and low-trust equilibria. Without electoral concerns, politicians favor high-trust equilibria and hire capable bureaucrats. In a polarized society, electoral concerns may prompt more policy-skeptical politicians to appoint less capable bureaucrats to diminish policy capacity and ensure low-trust equilibria. This strategy shifts future implementation decisions in favor of interventionist politicians. Moreover, it reduces voters' demand for interventionist decision-making.

Suggested Citation

  • Dana Sisak & Otto Swank, 2025. "Trust and Policy Capacity - Strategic Bureaucrat Appointments under Electoral Incentives," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 25-062/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250062
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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