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The consequences of the single supervisory mechanism for Europe's macro-prudential policy framework

Author

Listed:
  • André Sapir
  • Martin F. Hellwig
  • Marco Pagano
  • Viral V. Acharya
  • Leszek Balcerowicz
  • Arnoud Boot
  • Markus K. Brunnermeier
  • Claudia Buch
  • Ieke van den Burg
  • Charles Calomiris
  • Daniel Gros
  • Dario Focarelli
  • Alberto Giovannini
  • Andreas Ittner
  • Dirk Schoenmaker
  • Charles Wyplosz

Abstract

The European macro-prudential policy framework operates at two levels. First, the ESRB has a legal responsibility for macro-prudential oversight in the EU. Second, various national and EU authorities have responsibility for the implementation of macro-prudential policy. The creation of a European banking union is an important innovation within this two-level structure. In response to this innovation, this paper makes two key points. First, the ECB should be in charge of macro-prudential policies conferred by the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive. Within the ECB, macro-prudential decisions should be taken entirely by the Governing Council, while micro-prudential decisions should be prepared by the Supervisory Board. Second, the ESRB remains the only EU-wide body in charge of macro-prudential supervision, responsible for all financial activities. The ESRB's effectiveness could be strengthened by creating a post of Managing Director, who would carry out the policy determined by the General Board and would be responsible to the General Board for the management of the ESRB. JEL Classification: G28

Suggested Citation

  • André Sapir & Martin F. Hellwig & Marco Pagano & Viral V. Acharya & Leszek Balcerowicz & Arnoud Boot & Markus K. Brunnermeier & Claudia Buch & Ieke van den Burg & Charles Calomiris & Daniel Gros & Da, 2013. "The consequences of the single supervisory mechanism for Europe's macro-prudential policy framework," Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee 3, European Systemic Risk Board.
  • Handle: RePEc:srk:srkasc:20133
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    macroprudential regulation; market integration;

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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