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L'enseignement supérieur en France : analyse économique d'un effondrement (implosion) et des moyens d'une (re)naissance


  • Jean-Luc Gaffard

    (Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques)


Les dépenses d’enseignement supérieur et de recherche sont censées contribuer au niveau sinon au taux de croissance de la productivité de l’économie. C’est bien pourquoi l’Union européenne propose de retenir un objectif de 3 % du PIB dévolus à la R&D et de réformer les modes de gouvernance des institutions académiques. il s’agit de remédier à des difficultés structurelles qui tiennent certes au montant insuffisant des dépenses éducatives et de recherche, mais aussi aux conditions de leur gestion. La situation française est particulièrement emblématique à cet égard. Dans un contexte de pénurie de moyens affectés aux universités, les mécanismes de gouvernance sont à ce point défaillants qu’ils se traduisent par la formation de rentes et le développement de phénomènes d’exclusion préjudiciables aussi bien à l’efficacité qu’à l’équité (...).

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  • Jean-Luc Gaffard, 2007. "L'enseignement supérieur en France : analyse économique d'un effondrement (implosion) et des moyens d'une (re)naissance," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/6160, Sciences Po.
  • Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6160

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