Dégressivité des allocations chômage : une réforme ni nécessaire ni efficace
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- Bruno Coquet, 2016. "Dégressivité des allocations chômage : une réforme ni nécessaire ni efficace," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/19lnu2smsg8, Sciences Po.
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- Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002.
"Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1337-1371, October.
- Williamson, Stephen D. & Wang, Cheng, 1999. "Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating," Working Papers 99-03, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Wang, Cheng & Williamson, Stephen D., 2002. "Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10133, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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KeywordsAllocations chômage; Réforme; Dégressivité;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-10-23 (All new papers)
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