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First-Best and Second-Best Regulation of Solid Waste under Imperfect Competition in a Durable Good Industry

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  • Marco Runkel

Abstract

Under the assumption of imperfect competition in a durable good industry, the present paper investigates the efficient regulation of solid waste which causes environmental damage at the end of the product's life. It turns out that the second-best waste tax falls short of the marginal environmental damage if the producers rent their products but may also exceed the marginal damage if the producers sell their products. If in the sales case the industry is regulated with waste taxes and stock subsudies then the first-best tax-subsidy scheme also contains a waste tax which deviates from the marginal damage, in general. Under monopoly this tax unambiguously exceeds the marginal damage. Furthermore, the analysis provides a further reason why the Swan independence result generally doesn't hold in rental markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Runkel, 1999. "First-Best and Second-Best Regulation of Solid Waste under Imperfect Competition in a Durable Good Industry," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 81-99, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
  • Handle: RePEc:sie:siegen:81-99
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    File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-siegen.de/vwl/repec/sie/papers/81-99.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Eichner & Marco Runkel, 2000. "Efficient and Sustainable Management of Product Durability and Recyclability," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 88-00, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    2. Sagasta Elorza, Amagoia & Usategui Díaz de Otalora, José María, 2012. "Optimal overall emissions taxation in durable goods oligopoly," DFAEII Working Papers DFAEII;2012-18, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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