Regional Competition for the location of new facilities
A model of interregional competition for the location of new (production) facilities by a location decision maker (LDM) is analyzed as a differential game. Two regions try to enhance their attraction by making concessions to the LDM in order to raise the probability that a new facility will be located in a specific region, the benefit of which consists of the number of new jobs, new income etc. It is shown that the prospective benefits and costs of exerting influence are decisive for the final outcomes of the model. The open-loop Nash equilibrium solution -- which is also a degenerate feedback solution due to the simple structure of the model -- is likely to be inefficient in comparison with the cooperative solution of joint benefit maximization of both regions.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: ++49 (0)271 740-3139
Fax: ++49 (0)271 740-2590
Web page: http://www.uni-siegen.de/fb5/vwl/research/diskussionsbeitraege/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sie:siegen:75-99. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael Gail)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.