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The West usually portrays Thailand?s coup negatively. Middle class Thai generally regard it as last-chance attempt to save Thailand from becoming a failed state. Middle class Bangkok originally supported Thaksin, but turned against him in late 2005. Middle class support originally was essentially based on three key premises:1. Thailand can put up with certain levels of corruption, 2. provided the government delivers a strong economy. Government has always been corrupt, so continued corruption was not useful for determining how to vote.3. Thailand needs to do more to address inequality. The middle class was not originally against Thaksin?s populist policies ? early on, the policies seemed financially sustainable and gained support.The data show that none of these hopes actually worked out.Corruption: using Transparency International?s Corruption Perception Index, percentiles can control for changes in number of countries from 1995 to 2013. Previous governments slowly improved Thailand?s standing, but Thaksin made more rapid progress during his first term. Thailand reached the 33rd percentile in 2001 (from 17th in 1995), but reached the 61st percentile in 2005 and 2006. However, since 2007 Thailand has declined, and in 2013 it stood at 102 out of 175 countries, the 41st percentile. The drop was particularly rapid in 2012 and 2013.Economic competitiveness: according to World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Reports, Thailand declined in competitiveness from 2006 to 2014. It was ranked 35th in 2006-2007, and 37th in 2013-2014. This slight overall decline masks serious problems on most indicators ? Thailand showed strong improvement on ?financial market development?, but declined on nine out of twelve indicators. The largest decline was 51 ranks on ?labor market efficiency?, but ?institutions?, ?higher education and training?, ?technological readiness?, and ?innovation? all showed declines of 25 ranks or more.Inequality: World Bank data shows that Thailand made modest improvements in income distribution since 1992. The top 10 percent?s share of income declined from 39% to about 31%. However, Thaksin?s governments from 2001 substantially slowed the long-term trend toward more equitable income. Concentration of wealth at the top increased substantially the past few years, after little change from 2000 to 2010. Credit Suisse figures show that the top 10 percent increased their share from 66.7% to 75% over 2011-2013. The top 1% increased their share from 38.5% to 50.6%.Thus, the international indices show that Thaksinomics has resulted in a more corrupt, less competitive, and more unequal Thailand.
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JEL classification:
- O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
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