Altruistic Behavior and Correlated Equilibrium Selection
This paper studies new refinement concepts for correlated equilibria based on altruistic behavior of the players and which generalize some refinement concepts introduced by the authors in previous papers for Nash equilibria. Effectiveness of the concepts, relations with the corresponding notions for Nash equilibria and with other correlated equilibrium refinements are investigated. The analysis of the topological properties of the set of solutions concludes the paper.
|Date of creation:||13 Dec 2010|
|Publication status:||Published in International Game Theory Review, 2011, Vol. 13, 363-381.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: I-80126 Napoli|
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