Collusion in Corrupt System: A Game Theoretic Approach
There is a growing literature on the issue of corruption. In particular, there is a large body of work that looks at policy instruments relating to punishment, incentive or monitoring schemes for the control of crime. In this context this paper considers, within a game theoretic framework, the different instruments that are available for the control of corruption or pilferage and considers as an example the voluntary disclosure of income scheme (VDIS) introduced by successive Indian governments for tax collection.
|Date of creation:||2002|
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