IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Emerging cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma on dynamic networks

  • Christoly Biely


    (Complex Systems Research Group, HNO Medical University of Vienna)

  • Klaus Dragosits

    (Medical University of Vienna)

  • Stefan Thurner

    (Medical University of Vienna)

Registered author(s):

    We consider the classical prisoner's dilemma being played repeatedly on a dynamic network, where agents may choose their actions as well as their co-players. Agents act profit-maximizing, fully rationally and base their decision only on local information. Individual decisions are made such that links to defecting agents are resolved and such that cooperating agents build up links, as we assume that new interrelations are established via a process of recommendation. Unlike in networks with fixed topology, the network dynamics allows for a higher profit when choosing cooperation rather than defection, thus resolving the dilemma. In the case of perfect synchronization of strategy updates, the system exhibits oscillatory dynamics of overall cooperation and linkage. The cyclical behavior is lost and the system is stabilized at a predominant level of overall cooperation when players are updating strategies in a heterogeneous way; stable cooperative structures then form. Between the highly synchronized and the low-frequency regime, we find a region where network structure resembles 'complex' hierarchical topology and the level of total cooperation in the system reaches a maximum

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 with number 244.

    in new window

    Date of creation: 04 Jul 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:sce:scecfa:244
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sce:scecfa:244. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.