The Use of a Simple Decision Rule in Repeated Oligopoly Games
The Use of a Simple Decision Rule in Repeated Oligopoly Games Much interest has been directed towards decision rules and conditions when firms make decisions converging to a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in repeated oligopoly games. We explore the use of a simple decision rule where firms only need to have information about their own profits from the two previous periods. The principle of the decision rule is to choose a decision within a boundary of the decision that gave the highest profit in the two previous periods of the game. Simulations using the decision rule with different boundaries for both sequential and simultaneous decisions in the games are analyzed. Furthermore, experiments with a Cournot game, where five firms make decisions simultaneously, show that by using the rule firms with only information about their own profits make decisions similar to firms who also have information about market demand and competitors. In conclusion, the simple decision rule can be used to compute optimal decisions and the rule can also be used as a benchmark for decisions made in repeated oligopoly games.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sce:scecf4:320. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.