IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Monetary Policy with Imperfect Knowledge

  • Athanasios Orphanides amd John Williams

This paper studies the formulation of monetary policy in a changing environment when knowledge regarding some aspects of the structure of the economy is imperfect and an adaptive learning technology is available to the policymaker and economic agents. As a benchmark, we develop a simple model of the economy and identify efficient monetary policy rules under the assumptions that knowledge of the economy is perfect and expectations are formed rationally. We then relax the assumption of rational expectations and examine the design of policy when agents and/or the policymaker must rely on adaptive learning to form expectations. We show that policies that are efficient under rational expectations are no longer efficient under imperfect knowledge, and, conversely, that efficient policies under imperfect knowledge would appear inefficient to the outside observer who assumed perfect knowledge. Using these results, we discuss the role of imperfect knowledge on the evolution of monetary policy in the United States over the past twenty years.

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 with number 254.

in new window

Date of creation: 01 Apr 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf1:254
Contact details of provider: Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2007. "Inflation Targeting under Imperfect Knowledge," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Frederic S. Miskin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, edition 1, volume 11, chapter 4, pages 077-123 Central Bank of Chile.
  2. John C. Williams, 2005. "Robust estimation and monetary policy with unobserved structural change," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 53-81.
  3. Orphanides, Athanasios & Williams, John C., 2004. "The decline of activist stabilization policy: natural rate misperceptions, learning, and expectations," Working Paper Series 0337, European Central Bank.
  4. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2003. "Inflation scares and forecast-based monetary policy," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-41, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  5. Orphanides, Athanasios & Williams, John C., 2003. "Imperfect knowledge, inflation expectations, and monetary policy," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/40, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  6. Mccallum, Bennet T., 1988. "Robustness properties of a rule for monetary policy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 173-203, January.
  7. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2002. "Robust monetary policy rules with unknown natural rates," Working Paper Series 2003-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:

  1. Real-time data in Wikipedia English ne '')

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sce:scecf1:254. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.