An Evolutionary Model Of Debt
A reputational model of debt is examined from an evolutionary game perspective. The game is played between randomly matched opponents and we ask whether debt can be supported in the long run steady state when lenders are given the option of joining an information sharing coalition. The players are forward-looking, but otherwise not very sophisticated. The paper uses a mix of analytical and computational methods and we actually simulate such an economy and examine long run steady states. Conclusions are drawn about the nature of institutions that support debt.
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1994.
"The role of institutions in reputation models of sovereign debt,"
179, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Cole, Harold L. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 1995. "The role of institutions in reputation models of sovereign debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 45-64, February.
- Michi Kandori, 2010.
"Social Norms and Community Enforcement,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
630, David K. Levine.
- Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1998.
"Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
209, David K. Levine.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993.
"Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
- DANIEL B. KLElN, 1992. "Promise Keeping In The Great Society: A Model Of Credit Information Sharing," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 117-136, 07.
- Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June.
- P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
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