Spatial Restrictions And Coalition Formation: A Computational Approach
This paper illustrates the lack of research in the area of the process by which coalitions formed. Showing how the questions regarding process have been previously ignored, it demonstrates their importance. Then motives for a computational approach are addressed. The main point being that in order to analyze coalition formation, we must allow agents to actually make decisions and form coalitions. Then a model of coalition formation around a public good is proposed that consists of agents that have the ability to move a make decisions, a tree structure that represents the agent's paths taken to form a coalition and an auctioneer who adjusts the tax rate at any given node in order to attract agents. Then an experiment, using the model, is defined in order to analyze the affects that spatial restrictions have on coalition formation. Finally potential applications and modifications of the model are discussed.
|Date of creation:||05 Jul 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: CEF 2000, Departament d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas, 25,27, 08005, Barcelona, Spain|
Fax: +34 93 542 17 46
Web page: http://enginy.upf.es/SCE/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sce:scecf0:274. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.