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On Essential Nash Equilibria in Normal-Form Games

Author

Listed:
  • Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

    () (Rutgers University)

Abstract

A Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of games containing a dense, residual subset of games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection subsumes the sets of games considered in the literature. An economic game illustrates our results.

Suggested Citation

  • Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2012. "On Essential Nash Equilibria in Normal-Form Games," Departmental Working Papers 201209, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:201209
    as

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    infinite normal-form game; equilibrium refinement; essential equilibrium; equilibrium existence; B-security;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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