IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rnp/wpaper/052030.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Analysis of the effectiveness of public procurement procedures based on game-theoretic models
[Анализ Эффективности Процедур Государственных Закупок На Основе Теоретико-Игровых Моделей]

Author

Listed:
  • Zhemkova, Aleksandra (Жемкова, Александра)

    (The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)

Abstract

The paper proposes an approach for modeling and evaluating the process of public procurement from the basis of key findings of auction theory. The study has the following structure: the first chapter provides a literature review devoted to modeling and empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of auctions and the public procurement market. The second chapter provides a brief characteristic of the current state and legal foundations of procurement practices in Russia. The third chapter proposes an empirical assessment of a model of determinants of choosing a public procurement procedure by an auctioneer, and a model for evaluating the effectiveness (by the price of a contract) of existing public procurement procedures. The fourth chapter analyzes the main measures of economic policy in the field of procurement regulation, as well as the applicability of these measures in Russia. At the end of the paper, the main findings of the study and recommendations formed on their basis are presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhemkova, Aleksandra (Жемкова, Александра), 2020. "Analysis of the effectiveness of public procurement procedures based on game-theoretic models [Анализ Эффективности Процедур Государственных Закупок На Основе Теоретико-Игровых Моделей]," Working Papers 052030, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:wpaper:052030
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.ranepa.ru/rnp/wpaper/052030.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public procurement; game theory; game theory models; auctions; competition; dishonest behavior.;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rnp:wpaper:052030. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: RANEPA maintainer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aneeeru.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.