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Mediation in Bankruptcy Problems


  • Peris, Josep E.

    () (Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica)

  • Jiménez-Gómez, José M.

    () (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)


Mediation is a dispute resolution process where agents reach a mutually acceptable agreement among prominent proposals. This paper provides a natural way of coming to this agreement in bankruptcy problems. The central fact is that such problems can be faced from two different (focal) points of view: awards and losses. Given this views, we assume that agents decide a group of principles on which the distribution of the available resources should be based. Next we define a double recursive process by the application of both a lower and an upper bound on awards. Finally, we obtain that this process concludes at the midpoint between the two focal rules. By applying the result to some possible sets of principles we retrieve the average of old and well known bankruptcy rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Peris, Josep E. & Jiménez-Gómez, José M., 2012. "Mediation in Bankruptcy Problems," QM&ET Working Papers 12-2, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:qmetal:2012_002

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Villar, Antonio, 2004. "The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 245-257, March.
    2. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 2005. "Convergence under replication of rules to adjudicate conflicting claims," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 129-142, February.
    3. Stefano Moretti & Fioravante Patrone, 2008. "Transversality of the Shapley value," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 16(1), pages 1-41, July.
    4. José Alcalde & María Marco & José Silva, 2008. "The minimal overlap rule revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 109-128, June.
    5. Alcalde, José & Marco-Gil, María del Carmen & Silva-Reus, José A., 2012. "Tax Burden Degree as a Tool to Design Tax Systems," QM&ET Working Papers 12-11, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
    6. Shrieves, Ronald E. & Stevens, Donald L., 1979. "Bankruptcy Avoidance as a Motive For Merger," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(03), pages 501-515, September.
    7. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    8. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & M. Marco-Gil, 2014. "A new approach for bounding awards in bankruptcy problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 447-469, August.
    9. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
    10. Utz Weitzel & Killian J. McCarthy, 2011. "Theory and evidence on mergers and acquisitions by small and medium enterprises," International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 14(2/3), pages 248-275.
    11. Peters, Hans J M, 1986. "Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 153-169, January.
    12. Gustavo Bergantiños & Luciano Méndez-Naya, 2001. "Additivity in bankruptcy problems and in allocation problems," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 223-229.
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    More about this item


    Bankruptcy problems; Midpoint; Bounds; Recursivity;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations


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