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Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson: Asymmetric Information and Economic Institutions


  • Committee, Nobel Prize

    (Nobel Prize Committee)


Information for the Public, The Prize in Economic Sciences 2007. Buyers and sellers sometimes haggle too hard and therefore fail to trade. Desirable joint projects are sometimes not undertaken because the projects' beneficiaries fail to agree how the costs should be shared. Sickness insurance, for example, is typically criticized either for offering too little coverage or for inviting misuse. In either case, the basic problem is that people have an incentive to economize with their private information: some insurancy-policy sellers claim that their costs are high in order to increase the price; some beneficiaries of joint projects such as insurance-policy holders claim that their benefits are low in order to reduce their own contributions to the project; some well-insured workers claim that they are sick, in order to reduce their workload.

Suggested Citation

  • Committee, Nobel Prize, 2007. "Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson: Asymmetric Information and Economic Institutions," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2007-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_001

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Hian Hoon, 1996. "Payroll taxes and VAT in a labor-turnover model of the ‘natural rate’," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(3), pages 369-383, July.
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    6. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
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    8. Lucas, Robert Jr, 1976. "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 19-46, January.
    9. Sen, Amartya, 1995. "Inequality Reexamined," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198289289.
    10. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    11. Edmund S. Phelps & Hian Teck Hoon & Gylfi Zoega, 2004. "The Structuralist Perspective on Real Exchange Rate, Share Price Level and Employment Path: What Room is Left for Money?," Working Papers 05-2004, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    12. Ordover, J A & Phelps, Edmund S, 1975. "Linear Taxation of Wealth and Wages for Intragenerational Lifetime Justice: Some Steady-State Cases," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(4), pages 660-673, September.
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    asymmetric information; mechanism design;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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