George A. Akerlof, A. Michael Spence, Joseph E. Stiglitz: Information for the Public, Markets with Asymmetric Information
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- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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