일본의 FTA 추진전략과 정책적 시사점 (A Study on Japan's FTA Strategy and its Policy Implications for Korea)

Korean Abstract: 일본은 2013년 들어서부터 TPP, 일·EU FTA, RCEP, 한·중·일 FTA 등 메가 FTA 협상을 대대적으로 전개하고 있다. 한국이 이미 한·EU FTA와 한·미 FTA를 발효시킨 것에 비하면 일본의 미국, EU와의 FTA 체결은 늦는 대신 TPP 협상은 일본이 한국보다 앞서고 있다. 본 연구는 글로벌 가치 사슬 내에서 일본기업이 어떠한 기능을 수행하고 있는가를 분석한 다음, 일본의 기체결 FTA와 현재 협상이 진행 중인 TPP 및 EU와의 FTA에 초점을 맞춰 일본의 FTA 추진전략을 분석하였다. English Abstract: This research examines Japan's FTA strategies, focusing on Japan's 13 effective bilateral FTAs, and ongoing negotiations on the TPP and the EU-Japan FTA. Especially, this research sheds light on the differences between the ongoing two FTA negotiations and Japan's 13 existing bilateral FTAs in terms of Japan's FTA strategy. Chapter two analyzes the GVCs of Japanese companies from 1995 to 2011 based on EU World Input-output Tables (EU-WIOT). The results are as follows. Firstly, RCEP including China is the most important economic cooperation partner for Japan, as it is for Korea. In 2011, out of Japan's total value-added export, the RCEP-5 (South Korea, China, Australia, Indonesia and India) accounted for 27.7% which is larger than the 21.7% forTPP-4 (the US, Australia, Mexico, and Canada). The result implies that in terms of GVCs, concluding a regional FTA in East Asia involving China is advantageous for both Japan and Korea. Second, most of Japan's exports of final goods contribute to producing domestic intermediate goods. In 2011, 291.8 billion dollars of Japan's final goods exports led to 485.9 billion dollars of intermediate goods production at the global level. However, out of the total amount, production of foreign intermediate goods represented only 22.1% while the share of Japanese goods was 77.9%. In value added terms, out of the total amount, 297.6 billion dollars or 85.7% are returned to Japan compared to 61.9% for Korea. This result shows that Japan's intermediate goods production network is better developed than that of Korea. Japan has highlighted tariff elimination and cumulative rules of origin to maximize export enlargement effects following the FTA expansions. Third, Japanese manufacturers have maintained its competitiveness even in the late 2000s. Japanese RCA in value added had remained around 0.76 to 0.79. Also, even though Japan's total exports is only 1.48 times larger than that of Korea, Japan's value-added exports is 2.22 times larger than Korea's. It shows that Japanese exports has created a high rate of domestic value added, and implies the Japan's FTA could shortly bring more value-added into the domestic production and employment effects. Chapter three outlines how the Japanese government exploits FTAs in major negotiating chapters including tariff, rules of origin, service trade, intellectual property rights, etc., so as to expand GVCs of domestic enterprises. Also, this chapter examines the utilization of signed FTAs. The results can be summarized as: First, although the Japanese government emphasizes comprehensiveness and high level of liberalization in the 13 effective FTAs, their actual level of liberalization is low since they have chosen the FTA partners so as to protect their agriculture, fisheries and livestock markets. Second, 72 types of complex rules of origin in FTAs by Japan lower the utilization of FTAs by increasing burdens on Japanese companies to achieve the certificate of origin. To lighten the burden, the government introduced 'autonomous certificate system for Customs Approved Registered Exporter' to the Japan-Switzerland FTA and applied the system both to Japan-Peru and Japan-Mexico FTAs. However, challenges remain for the government to unify rules of origin and seek an effective way to utilize cumulative rules of origin. Third, despite the dramatic increase in the number of certificates of origin issued by the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the growth of Japanese companies’ FTA utilization rate from 36.2% in 2009 to 42.9% in 2013 according to the JETRO survey, the FTA utilization rate of Japanese companies is still low. It is mainly caused by low liberalization level of signed FTAs. In fact, even goods receiving preferential tariff often could not benefit due to the rules of origin, high cost and complex process for a certificate of origin, and lack of information on the FTA procedure system. Chapter four divides major issues of the TPP-12 negotiations into market access for goods and rules, then examines Japanese strategy in the TPP-12 negotiations. The results are as follows: Firstly, it is hardly possible to sign the TPP by the targeted deadline at the end of 2014, but still the US-Japan negotiations are critical to concluding the agreement. The TPP, a multilateral FTA, could also be considered a bilateral FTA between the US and Japan. It is because with respect to negotiations on tariff and intellectual property rights, Japan's acceptance of American demands would determine the results. Also, concluding the bilateral negotiation on market access on agriculture and livestock is a prerequisite, even though it is uncertain whether other participants would accept the settlement. Second, Japan's TPP strategy can be summarized as mutual protection allowance for the US Automobile market and Japan's agricultural market. This Japanese exchange strategy had been effective until Japan's official declaration of participation in the TPP, in February of 2013. However, at the moment, the end of 2014, the strategy seems to be losing strength. For instance, the TPP negotiations for tariffs and safeguards on pork, beef, and dairy products included in the main 5 items of agriculture and livestock industry are facing difficulties even at the working level consultation with the US. Chapter five analyzes the main issues of the ongoing FTA negotiation between Japan and the EU and countermeasures of the Japanese government. Two results are revealed as below: Firstly, the EU-Japan FTA is expected to be more comprehensive than recently concluded FTAs such as the EU-Korea, and the EU-Singapore. Negotiations for the EU-Japan FTA handled various issues; overall commodity trade including tariffs, technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), service trade, e-commerce, investment, government procurement, intellectual property rights, competition, trade and sustainable development, conflict resolution, non-tariff measures, rules of origin, customs clearance facilitation, geographical indications, animal welfare, corporate governance, business environment, and so on. Second, the biggest issue in the EU-Japan FTA negotiation is the reduction or elimination of non-tariff barriers. For the EU to balance benefits against Japan which has low tariffs, it would need an effective strategy in demanding that Japan remove its non-tariff barriers. However, regulatory reforms of the Japanese government are limited to regulatory harmonization, trade facilitation and streamlining customs procedures. Ultimately, the pace of the FTA would be dependent on Japan’s reduction of non-tariff barriers and the EU’s acceptance of that level. Therefore, Japan should especially promote regulatory reforms among structural reforms known as the ‘third arrow’ of Abenomics. At the same time, the government needs to deal with harsh demands from Mega FTAs regarding non-tariff barriers.